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U.S. Jurisdiction Over Conflicts Arising
Outside of the United States: Some
Hegemonic Implications
BYUGO MATTEI* & JEFFREY LENA**

In the last several years, numerous lawsuits have been filed in
United States federal and state courts relating to the tragedies of
World War II asserting what are commonly referred to as "Holocaust
Claims." The claimants maintain that the wrongs alleged-which
include concealment of bank accounts, withholding of victim gold,
looting of art, confiscation of real property, and failure to pay out
long overdue insurance proceeds-are best adjudicated by U.S.
courts. Plaintiffs' argument has been that, while the claims are
temporally and spatially remote from American courts, the
procedural mechanisms afforded by U.S. courts-principally
discovery and the class action mechanism-permit the efficient
disposition of the claims.
There is no denying the dire tragedy and emotional impact of the
plaintiffs' claims. Indeed, they are more than mere claims. They are
the detritus of millions of ruined lives. Each case involves stories
about still-living plaintiffs or their friends and family, being either
brutally subjected to Nazi horror during the war (looted asset and
slave labor claims), or unscrupulously denied access to their legal
entitlements after the war (insurance and bank deposit claims).
Several countries have acknowledged either complicity with the Nazis
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through government activity (the French Vichy government, for
example), or at least some sort of withholding of money not their own
(Swiss and French banks). Commissions have been authorized and
funded (Bergier in Switzerland, Matteoli in France, and Eizenstat in
the United States) to pursue the question.! A substantial literature
has also emerged. One thinks of Richard Chesnoff's Pack of Thieves:
How Hitler and Europe Plundered the Jews and Committed the
Greatest Theft in History, the recently revised book by Mark Aarons
and John Loftus, Unholy Trinity: The Vatican, the Nazis, and Soviet
Intelligence, and Tom Bower's book, Nazi Gold: The Full Story of the
Fifty-Year Swiss-Nazi Conspiracy to Steal Billions from Europe'sJews
and Holocaust Survivors as only three of many examples.! There is a
clamor for justice. And, it should be added, the new litigation does
not relate only to the European Theatre of World War II. Substantial
and non-frivolous claims have been filed in U.S. courts by both
American and foreign nationals alleging forced labor and sexual
slavery by the Japanese in the Pacific Theatre of the war. In short, at
the turn of the twenty-first century, U.S. courts are undertaking
adjudication of the horrors of World War II.
But in the surging interest to assist these aging plaintiffs in the
United States, important questions arise that will endure beyond the
life of the claims themselves. This brief paper focuses on the question
of why these claims, which have no original factual connection to the
United States, have nevertheless been brought in U.S. courts some
fifty years later. We suggest that the expansionist thrust of the
jurisdiction of U.S. courts over such claims may be viewed as a sort of
legal imperialism in which the United States (and some of its member
1. The so-called "Eizenstat Report," actually performed under the direction of
State Department Historian Richard Slany, is of particular interest because it
effectively provides much of the factual ground work for the U.S. holocaust-related
lawsuits and provided, at a crucial moment, the United States State Department "seal
of approval" for these suits to be brought in U.S. courts. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
U.S. AND ALLIED EFFORTS TO RECOVER AND RESTORE GOLD AND OTHER ASSETS
STOLEN OR HIDDEN BY GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II: PRELIMINARY STUDY

(1997); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,

U.S. AND ALLIED WARTIME AND POSTWAR RELATIONS
AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH ARGENTINA, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, SWEDEN, AND TURKEY ON
LOOTED GOLD AND GERMAN EXTERNAL ASSETS AND U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT THE

FATE OF THE WARTIME USTASHA TREASURY (1998).
2. MARK AARONS & JOHN LOFTUS, UNHOLY TRINITY (new

& rev. ed. 1998);

RICHARD CHESNOFF, PACK OF THIEVES: How HITLER AND EUROPE PLUNDERED THE

JEWS AND COMMITTED THE GREATEST THEFT IN HISTORY (1999); TOM BOWER, NAZI
GOLD: THE FULL STORY OF THE FIFTY-YEAR SWISS-NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL
BILLIONS FROM EUROPE'S JEWS AND HOLOCAUST SURVIVORS

(1997).
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states) asserts itself upon the rest of the world. Approaching the
question from a foreign legal perspective, we ask: what are the
implications of this expansionist policy upon transnational legal
practice?
The mechanics of the jurisdictional rules and policies that have
resulted in these cases being brought in the United States are
technical and complex. It is not our intent to describe them in any
detail here. Rather, we will try to depict a trend toward the use of
those mechanisms as applied to foreign legal claims and to shed light
on this phenomenon as part of the Americanization of the global
legal order? To do so we will, in Part I, describe the phenomenon
that we wish to discuss. In Part II, we will describe the fundamental
characteristics of the U.S. procedural system that make it so attractive
for plaintiffs to file their cases in the United States. In Part III, we
will discuss the implications of an aggressive U.S. judiciary for the
exercise of transnational legal practice and suggest how and why the
U.S. judiciary is successfully asserting itself around the globe. Finally,
in Part IV, we will try to explain the legal phenomenon in connection
with its economic background.
Part I
The United States Constitution reflects the natural law beliefs
that dominated late eighteenth century jurisprudence and political
discourse. A primary tenet of those beliefs was the recognition,
preservation and vindication of individual rights, whether they arose
in the United States or abroad.4 The framers and the first generation
to follow them gave substance to those beliefs in part through the
3. For a first attempt to explain post-war Americanization in structural legal
terms, see Ugo Mattei, Why the Wind Changed: Intellectual Leadership in Western
Law, 42 AM. J. CoMp. L. 195 (1994) (discussing changes of legal hegemony in modem
times from France to Germany to the United States). For a broader theoretical
discussion going beyond the notion of Americanization towards that of Empire, see
MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 160 (2000).
4. This aspect of U.S. jurisprudence has remained largely buried through the
20th century and is only recently being excavated in the interest of bolstering modem
claims to human rights jurisprudence. As Jordan Paust points out, what we presently
term "human rights" has a long and rich tradition in American legal and political
discourse. Whether called "inalienable rights," "natural rights," the "common rights
of mankind," "immutable rights," or otherwise, this concept informed U.S.
constitutionalism and jurisprudence from the outset. See JORDAN J. PAUST,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AS THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 167-292 (1996) (chapter
five entitled On Human Rights: The Use of Human Right Precepts in U.S. History and
the Right to an Effective Remedy).
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idea that international law could be seen as a system of customary
protection of the most fundamental individual rights through their
incorporation in the American legal system. This was reflected in
Article III of the Constitution itself, which, while concerned with
limiting federal jurisdiction vis-A-vis the state courts of the United
States, interpreted the notion of cases "arising under this Constitution
[and] the Laws of the United States" to include international law
claims based on both custom and treaty. The Constitution also
granted "alienage" jurisdiction over all cases between "a State, or the
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." This set
the stage for the expansive vision of federal court authority in all
areas that touched on foreign affairs.6 Subsequently, Congress further
extended subject matter jurisdiction to U.S. federal courts through
passage of the Alien Tort Statute, part of the original Judiciary Act of
1789. That statute, today codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 ("ACTA"),
provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." While the origin
of the Act remains somewhat obscure, its likely practical purpose was
to afford jurisdiction over piracy claims. On a theoretical level, it also
signaled the early view that the U.S. judiciary was prepared to extend
its enlightened political and legal beliefs beyond its own borders.
For almost 200 years, it lay practically dormant. Particularly with
respect to the nebulous "law of nations" prong, U.S. courts were
reluctant to assert jurisdiction over claims between aliens. But the
statute suddenly came to life in the 1980 case of Filartiga v. PenaIrala.7 In Filartiga,the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the act complained of-torture of a Paraguay citizen
by a Paraguay official acting under color of law-violated the "law of
nations" directly incorporated in Federal Common Law through
Article III of the United States Constitution With that decision, the
5. See id. at 1-9 (exploring theories of incorporation).
6. The logic behind the federal courts taking original jurisdiction over these
matters was to ensure that they would be heard, to the greatest extent possible, in

federal and not state courts on the theory that the federal sovereign, having been
vested with the sole power over foreign relations, should also have jurisdiction over
matters concerning the law of nations. This effectively limited state court
jurisdiction, which was in all other respects plenary and not limited by the federal
Constitution.
7. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
8. This, of course, was not a new idea. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.

(5 Wheat.) 153, 161 (1820) ("The common law ...recognises and punishes piracy as
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nascent potential for U.S. courts to vindicate wrongs committed
throughout the world, and thereby protect the natural rights of the
world's individuals, was given its first full modern expression. Since
Filartaga,each of the U.S. circuits, with the singular exception of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, has cited the case with
approval for the proposition that the ACTA creates a federal cause of
action sounding in tort.9

Clearly, such jus cogens violations of natural rights conflicting
with clearly established norms of international law can and do happen
everywhere in the world; in theory, then, the United States may be
transformed into a forum for the world's grievances.10 And the
purpose of this paper is not to suggest that such acts should not,
somehow, be brought to the bar of justice. Rather, the question we
pose is whether it is appropriate for an individual nation-state to
provide that bar.
The potential world-wide jurisdiction of the American judiciary
has been historically balanced by a number of countervailing
principles. For example, one limitation on jurisdiction is the doctrine
of "minimum contacts," under which the plaintiff must show, under a
general personal jurisdiction analysis, that the defendant has
"systematic" and "continuous" contacts with the forum if the basis for
personal jurisdiction does not relate to the claim itself, and that such
contacts are not accidental, but rather based upon purposeful
availment of the benefits and protections of the forum's laws.1
The constitutional doctrine of justiciability provides another
important limitation on a U.S. court's ability to adjudicate foreign
an offence, not against its own municipal code, but as an offence against the law of
nations.. ."). The incorporation idea is described in PAUST, supra note 4.
9. For a view from abroad of the ACTA and related jurisdictional and
substantive law, see Michael Swan, InternationalHuman Rights Tort Claims and the
Experience of United States Courts: An Introduction to the U.S. Case Law, Key
Statutes and Doctrines, in TORTURE AS A TORT 65-107 (Craig Scott ed., 2001). For a
recent interesting and accessible discussion ascribing the origins of the act primarily
to piracy, see P.A. McLean, The Court of Last Resort, CAL. LAW., Sept. 2001, at 36.
10. The use of international law as a basis for asserting claims under Federal
Common Law was slow to develop because general consensus as to what might be
considered a violation of a jus cogens norm developed most rapidly in the second half
of the twentieth century. See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 439-40
(D.N.J. 1999) (describing the growing consensus as to what constitutes a violation of
a jus cogens norm); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§
102(2), 702 (1987).
11. We of course refer here to InternationalShoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945), Hanson v. Denckl, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) and their progeny.
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claims. When the defense of non-justiciability is raised, the court is
required to determine whether the issue at bar involves a "political
question" that unnecessarily interferes with the foreign relations
powers committed to the other branches of government-Congress

and the President. The finding of a "political question" may be based
on a number of theories, including whether the court's adjudication of
the claim would embarrass or interfere with the co-ordinate branches,

whether the claim has historically been handled by the co-ordinate
branches, and whether or not a decision might result in "multiple

pronouncements" on the question. Thus, where vindication of rights
would appear to the court to interfere unduly with powers committed

to other branches of government, it will decline jurisdiction. As well,
the prudential doctrine of "comity"

allows a court to decline

jurisdiction out of respect for other nations.12
A fourth limitation is provided by the unwillingness of foreign
courts to enforce judgments of American courts where independent

review by the judicial authority of the foreign country determines that
there would be no jurisdiction under the law of the foreign forum."
Other doctrines, such as forum non conveniens, have been

interpreted by U.S. courts to safeguard the principle that they have
jurisdiction, but allows them to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
when it is more proper for the litigation to proceed outside the
United States.14 While in theory a forum non conveniens defense

would appear strong in these cases, the court's decision is based upon
a balancing of interests and the sound discretion of the trial court.
12. Baker v. Carr,369 U.S. 186 (1962) remains the most important statement of
what constitutes a "political question" and sets forth an analytical framework for
making that determination. All subsequent cases relating to justiciability are
substantially glosses on Baker. The doctrine contemplates a variety of nonprudential constitutional bars to the exercise of jurisdiction. The one most frequently
cited in these cases is the commitment of the foreign relations power to the
coordinate political branches, as discussed in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 302 (1918). A relevant modem discussion of the doctrine may be found in Kadic
v. Karadzic,70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
13. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 13-88 (1988) (discussing the so-called
mirror image principle).
14. While employment of the doctrine is not uniform among state courts, some
uniformity has developed on the federal level after the Supreme Court wrote
extensively on the topic in PiperAircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981) (holding
that interests of real parties in interest, in light of evidence, law, and convenience,
counselled adjudicating wrongful death action in Scotland, not United States). See
also Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189 (S.D.N.Y 1996); Gulf Oil v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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Hence, where there is any fear that a factually legitimate claim may
not receive fair treatment in foreign courts, U.S. courts may be
disinclined to apply the doctrine, and the defendant is therefore stuck
litigating in the United States even though all the events, evidence,
defendants, and applicable substantive law are connected with a
foreign jurisdiction. 5
Thus, despite these and other counter-principles, it can be said
that, generally speaking, American law has always claimed for itself,
on a planetary scale, a role as protector of not only American citizens,
but of all persons throughout the world. 6
While for many decades the potential for American law to
extend its reach into foreign lands remained largely unexploited (and
perhaps unknown outside of a relatively restricted sphere of
international law experts), the impressive explosion of Holocaustrelated litigation in 1996 provided the phenomenon with world-wide
exposure. 7 Indeed, European lawyers representing a large number of
Europe-based corporations active in insurance, banking and industry
are today involved in one capacity or another in litigation on both
coasts of the United States concerning hundreds of claims based on
facts that occurred more than a half century ago. Because the
Holocaust is removed in time and space from the United States," and
15. The Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act, a model law for
adoption by the various state jurisdictions, provides a fair general statement of the

doctrine: "When the court finds that in the interest of substantial justice the action
should be heard in another forum, the court may stay or dismiss the action in whole

or in part on any conditions that may be just." UNIF. INTERSTATE AND INT'L
PROCEDURE AcT § 1.05 (1986).
16. One need not look far into the pages of American history to find numerous
examples of this U.S. view of itself as the protector of interests abroad in the political

as well as the legal realm. From the Monroe Doctrine, which was the defining United
States foreign policy statement of the nineteenth century, to the violent interventions

(or strategic support therefor) in Vietnam, Indonesia, the Persian Gulf, Columbia,
and the Balkans, the United States has intervened where such intervention is coincident with its own interests. In so doing the United States has often disregarded
the very international law precepts embraced when a U.S. court takes ACTA

jurisdiction over alien tort claims.

See

WILLIAM

I.

ROBINSON,

POLYARCHY: GLOBALIZATION, U.S. INTERVENTION, AND HEGEMONY

PROMOTING

(1996); see also

NOAM CHOMSKY, ROGUE STATES (2000).

17. See Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in
United States Courts, 34 U. RICH. L. REv. 1 (2000). This mega-article, hundreds of

pages long, details the various Holocaust cases, albeit decisively from the plaintiffs'
perspective. Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' bent, it is an excellent account of the
factual range and legal theories underlying plaintiffs' claims.
18. From another perspective, it may be noted that not uncommonly the
plaintiffs

are persons who were once citizens of European

countries who
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given the nature of judicial challenge to actions carried on under the
shadow of foreign law and politics, the Holocaust litigation is the
most extreme and symbolic episode of a world-wide trend in
international litigation in which U.S. courts promote themselves as de
facto judges of world history.
In addition to the emotional implications of such litigation,
Holocaust-related litigation may also be viewed as an indictment of
this very activist jurisdictional posture of U.S. courts. From the
international perspective, this posture is now resented as a major

phenomenon of legal imperialism because of the way in which it
imposes American standards of not only substantive law (which are in
any case, with respect to these appalling events, largely shared by

most nations in the world), but also procedure and legal culture. In
particular, the relatively pro-plaintiff nature of U.S. procedure, which
has already created so many difficulties from a foreign legal

perspective, 9 is once again imposing standards that offend the legal
sensibilities of non-American lawyers."
Part II
Defendants have always filed comprehensive motions to dismiss
(or their state-based procedural equivalents) arguing American
courts do not have, or should decline to take, jurisdiction over these
matters. Interestingly, with the exception of one Holocaust insurance
claim, one French bank claim, and one Austrian looted art claim,"
subsequently became United States citizens. Like any country, American courts
would, of course, like to offer a forum to their own citizens. This does not change the
fact, however, that the events themselves took place generations ago, on another
continent, when the plaintiffs were citizens of other countries, and that defendants,
evidence, and substantive law continues to be in those countries.
19. One thinks, for example, of the disputes that arose during the Evidence
Convention negotiations at the Hague Conference of Private International law. The

best and most accessible discussion of this remains

RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL.,

470-75 (6th ed. 1998).
20. Discovery "American Style" is resented in particular out of a concern for
defendant's privacy. For a discussion of the French culture, see James Beardsley,
Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 459 (1986). For a
general discussion, see David J. Gerber, ExtraterritorialDiscovery and the Conflict of
ProceduralSystems: Germany and the United States, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 745 (1986).
21. Stern v. Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A., No. BC 185376, 1999 WL 167546 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1999) (asserting jurisdiction and denying motion to dismiss
insurance claim filed in California state court, after which case settled); Bodner v.
Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (in bank account case, denying
motion to dismiss on grounds of standing, comity and statute of limitations); Altmann
v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (denying motion to
COMPARATIVE LAW
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few of the nearly five hundred Holocaust-related actions filed in U.S.
federal or state courts have ever reached the stage of a full-fledged
decision on the comprehensive "motion to dismiss. '
It might be useful, for a readership not limited to Americantrained lawyers, to explain briefly the way in which litigation proceeds
in its early phases in a U.S. court of law. In Common Law countries,
procedure is traditionally considered within the domain of each court.
While the American system is federal and therefore somewhat
variegated among the states, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide the general model for procedure both in federal and state
courts. Moreover, to avoid confusion, it should be mentioned that in
American law, the Constitution is "the supreme law of the land" and
it must be applied together with the whole system of federal law, not
only in federal courts but in state courts as well. This means that
international litigation can occur (and indeed is occurring with
respect to Holocaust litigation) before both federal and state courts
under the very same federal constitutional principles that we have
mentioned in the previous section.2 It should be noted that while
most of these cases are filed in federal courts because either diversity
or federal question jurisdiction is available, U.S. state courts are
courts of general jurisdiction empowered to hear federal questions as
well. Federal substantive and constitutional law is applied where
relevant. Some, but not all, of the state court claims have been
removed to federal court.
dismiss on grounds of full sovereign immunity in Klimt looted art case), appealfiled,
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, Case No. 01-56003, Consolidated Case No. 01-56398
(9th Cir. Sept. 21,2001).
22. The "motion to dismiss" in United States federal procedure occurs at an
initial stage of litigation in which defendants raise a number of defenses, including
statute of limitations and related equitable defense doctrines, failure to state a claim,
non-justiciability, abstention theories like comity or forum non conveniens, lack of
standing to sue, lack of subject or personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and
others under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. State courts, though
they do not follow the Federal Rules, have similar procedural mechanisms for
challenging plaintiffs' claims. Rule 12 motions can be brought successively as the
case develops. So, for example, where an initial motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction fails, that defense may be reasserted if additional facts develop
indicating that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
23. This is the case despite the tendency, noted above, for these cases to be
concentrated at the federal level. In fact, many of the cases originally filed in state
courts were "removed" to federal courts on motions by the defendants pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441 either based upon diversity or based upon some governing federal
question that would have allowed the action to be originally filed in United States
federal court.
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Differences in terms of substantive law and procedural details

might still play a large role when skillful forum shopping plaintiffs
choose a forum in the United States. Three examples from the State
of California will suffice. The California legislature has attempted to
create a friendly environment for Holocaust litigation by passing
statutes purporting to toll the statute of limitations on slave labor

claims until the year 2010 and voiding forum selection clauses in
Holocaust era insurance contracts. These first two changes were
designed to create a friendly forum by eliminating by legislative fiat
two strong defenses to the claims. Finally, resourceful plaintiffs'
attorneys have also turned to California's broad and generally

worded "unfair business practices" statute to claim that insurance
companies failing to pay on contracts and who refuse to disgorge
profits from their prior failure to pay on the contracts should pay

treble damages and be enjoined from engaging in business in the
state.24 Both the extension of the applicable statute of limitations and

the voiding of forum selection clauses are suspect on due process
grounds, and the use of the unfair business practices statute is novel,

to say the least.
It may be helpful, at this juncture, to explain the rudiments of an

action in a U.S. court.'

An action begins with a "complaint" that

must be served on the defendants, and which can be amended a

number of times subsequent to service as the plaintiff's case is refined
through discovery and the development of additional legal theories.
In international litigation, service is usually effected pursuant to Rule
4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,26 or according to the

prescripts of the Hague Convention, 27 or by letter rogatory when
foreign sovereigns are named as defendants.' After being served,

24. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200, et seq.
25. Terminology is uniform in the federal system, but varies in state courts.
Here, we will discuss procedure using federal terminology.
26. This section sets forth specific rules for service "upon a party not an
inhabitant of or found within the state ... [where the service] is to be effected upon
the party in a foreign country."
27. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T 361, 656 U.N.T.S. 163. The
Hague Convention on Service of Process has significantly simplified service
requirements within signatory countries.
28. Letter rogatory is the traditional method of service on foreign sovereigns and
relies upon transmittal of the complaint to the defendant through diplomatic
channels of the United States and the receiving state. Other methods may be
considered permissible, however. See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 28 U.S.C. §
1602 (2001) (providing for several methods of service even on foreign sovereigns).
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defendants must "answer or otherwise respond" within a specified
time in order to avoid a default judgment. In the Holocaust cases, the
response to the complaint uniformly takes the form of a "motion to
Plaintiffs then must file an
dismiss" on a variety of grounds.'
opposition to the motion to dismiss, and defendants then must file a
reply to the plaintiff's opposition. Extensive oral arguments are
thereafter entertained by the presiding court. In high profile cases
where history as well as money are at stake, the questioning is close
and courts justifiably offer both sides every opportunity to clarify
their arguments.
Under present law, even at the earliest stages, plaintiffs are
normally entitled to substantial merits-related discovery,' and may
also request special discovery related to anticipated jurisdictional
issues. Where the jurisdictional issues are weighty, it is possible to
have the substantive merits-related discovery held in abeyance until
some of the early jurisdictional issues are addressed. A magistrate
judge commonly presides over discovery matters." What for civilians
is the stunning reach of U.S. discovery rules32 is one of the most
important factors explaining the present hegemony of U.S. law in
world-wide litigation. American style discovery, often experienced by
defendants as a "fishing expedition," is traditionally resented in
As American lawyers know, discovery is
European countries.
designed not only to ferret out merely "admissible" evidence, but
also to allow the discovering party to examine any information
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."3' 3 It is a broad net to which foreign defendants are entirely
unaccustomed. The European discomfort with this broad net is well
documented by Article 23 of the Hague Convention on the Taking of

29. See supra note 13; FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
30. Indeed, presently the federal "default" discovery rules provide that the
parties must exchange relevant merits-related documents at the outset of the
proceedings; where jurisdictional defenses are raised, however, defendants may seek
relief from such initial document exchange. The default rule is stated at FED.R. Civ.
P. 26(a)(1).
31. The magistrate judge is not an Article III "constitutional judge" appointed by
the President, and is not subject to congressional confirmation. Nevertheless, they
are generally considered to be judges of high quality, and the fact that discovery
issues are relegated to them does not mean that discovery has a secondary role in the
system. A magistrate judge's decision is directly appealable to the assigned Article
IIjudge.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 34 which allows
signatory countries to deny cooperation in matters of American style
discovery. Article 23 provides: "A contracting state may at the time
of signature ratification or accession declare that it will not execute
letters of request issued for the purpose of obtaining non-trial
discovery of documents as known in common law countries."35 A
majority of the signatories to the convention have made such an
Article 23 declaration.36
Also at the preliminary stages, a number of pre-trial conferences
are mandated by the court in order to discuss the timing of the
litigation and to seek as much cooperation as possible among
counsel.37 Out-of-court settlement is encouraged, sometimes quite
aggressively, by American judges. In the Holocaust context, a classic
but by no means unique example is provided by Judge Korman's
handling of In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation." In that case,
Judge Korman allowed the parties to extensively brief all of the
preliminary issues and heard extended oral arguments from counsel.
Thereafter, he declined to rule on defendant's motion to dismiss for
over a year in order to give the parties the opportunity to settle the
case. The settlement talks were guided by Judge Korman personally
and by a "special master" that he appointed for that purpose. As
political pressure and the fear of an adverse ruling built on both sides,
a settlement was ultimately achieved. In effect, settlement may be
said to be directly attributable to Judge Korman's management of the
litigation to achieve settlement.
It is important to note that while the court will be quite flexible
under certain circumstances, docket pressures in the majority of
courts ultimately result in the judge pushing the case along. Decisions
usually come rapidly in cases where the judge has decided not to
encourage settlement by withholding judgement on the initial motion
to dismiss. Typically, a ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed de
34. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or
Commercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847
U.N.T.S. 241.
35. Id. at art. 23.
36. Canada, France, The Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K. moreover issued socalled "blocking statutes" prohibiting compliance with discovery orders of American
courts. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra
note 19, at 472.
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
38. In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (adjudicating Swiss bank account and looted asset claims).
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novo on issues of law and on a "clearly erroneous" standard for issues
of fact.
The preceding paragraphs offer but a glimpse of the initial stages
of litigation. Even at this early phase, it is complicated, time
consuming, and very expensive.
For example, in complex
international litigation involving issues of foreign law, a rather
extensive role for expert witnesses might be involved. Expensive
expert declarations would be needed to address issues of foreign law,
but experts might also be needed for other factual questions before
the court (e.g., historians, bankers, experts on business practice, and
the like, who must be dearly compensated for their time and
knowledge). Moreover, the responsible attorney must absorb, to a
great extent, the impact of the foreign law on the case and be
prepared to argue it both on the briefs and at oral argument. Because
each point of law in the motion to dismiss must be thoroughly
briefed-involving massive searches of the case law for helpful
precedent-large numbers of attorneys are typically involved in
various capacities, charging rates ranging from $200 to $500 per hour.
It is no exaggeration to estimate that defending even an entirely
spurious claim involving complex international litigation in the
United States might cost a defendant not less than one million dollars
per year. This "third factor"-the high cost of litigation-in part
explains the high rate of out-of-court settlements. To be sure, there
are procedural tools to discourage completely frivolous litigation and
to discourage unreasonable litigation of non-frivolous claims. 9
Nevertheless, when highly emotional issues such as those at stake in
Holocaust-related litigation are at bar, it is unlikely that such devices
would be used by courts that in principle cannot help but be
sympathetic to the plaintiff's side.
The financial pressure that can be imposed on a defendant sued
in the United States together with the highly intrusive and potentially
embarrassing discovery devices are not the only reasons why the U.S.
judicial system is a plaintiff's paradise. There are other structural
39. The bringing of frivolous claims is primarily controlled by Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for sanctions and the payment of

attorneys' fees where an action has been brought absent a reasonable good faith
basis. And, the court often exercises its "inherent power" to control its own court by
ordering sanctions against attorneys or parties who needlessly waste court time or
force opponents to expend time and money needlessly. Both Rule 11 and the
sanction power are important checks on the "open door" policy in U.S. courts, which
encourages parties to bring claims. But where the substance of the claims implicates

human rights, courts may be disinclined to apply these mechanisms.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 24:381

features as well. To begin with, the system of attorney compensation
is, at least in tort cases, very attractive for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs'
attorneys are usually compensated on a contingency fee basis, i.e.,
they are only paid out of the amount of money that they can extract
from defendants, either by settlement or as a damage award. Defense
attorneys, on the other hand, are typically compensated on an hourly
basis, usually a less lucrative but more certain form of compensation.
This means that the whole risk and expense of complex litigation are
sustained on the plaintiff's side by attorneys motivated either by the
hope of a return on a good investment or, when acting pro bono, as
are many of the firms involved in the Holocaust-related litigation, by
the high visibility that their involvement entails.' For the plaintiff,
suing in a U.S. court is a "risk free, no cash advance" proposition.
This would simply be impossible in any other jurisdiction due to
restrictions on the unavailability of contingency fee agreements.
Moreover, for the plaintiff, suing in a U.S. court is potentially
lucrative because tort law in the United States has been very creative
in terms of doctrines employed to extend liability to defendants. One
need only think of the "market share liability" concept first employed
in the pharmaceutical class action setting. A second feature of the
system is, of course, the availability of punitive damages.4 ' A third is
the employment of the jury to determine liability and damages.
Jurors tend to be sympathetic to victims, adopting a "rough equity"
approach, and are sometimes liberal with standards of proof.
Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the vehicle of the class
action itself is one of the most powerful attractions of a U.S. forum.42
As American lawyers know well, the class action allows
"representative" plaintiffs to pursue an action on behalf of a "plaintiff
class" and offers a means of disposing of sometimes hundreds of
40. It is also proper to acknowledge that the attorney compensation schemes
worked out in several of the cases reflect no avarice by the attorneys. In the so-called
"fairness hearings" under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts are

mandated to determine whether the compensation of class action attorneys who are
settling putative class actions is a fair and reasonable sum. While the typical
contingency fee is 30% before trial and 40% after trial, attorney compensation in the
Holocaust cases has hovered between one and three percent, and all compensation
arrangements have been approved as "fair" as far as we can determine. There is no
question, on the other hand, that the exposure these cases have engendered is surely
beneficial in acquiring future business.
41. There are, however, practical limitations on enforcement of such awards in
foreign jurisdictions when not in conformity with a foreign ordrepublic. This concept
is discussed below in the last section.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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thousands of claims in one trial, with the sole remaining issue being
proof of damages. In a word, the class action is a technical device that
allows relatively small individual interests that could never afford the
costs of litigation to aggregate, forming a large and structured interest
strong enough to attract plaintiffs' lawyers to litigate the claims. This
procedural mechanism is available only in the United States and
provides a strong incentive to invest in litigation in the United States,
where the return (for attorneys) may be astronomical even though
each individual claim is relatively small.
Sometimes litigation in the United States would appear to be the
only vehicle available for vindication of rights. And this is indeed one
of the strongest rhetorical rationales promoting the hegemony of
American law in the international context. The class action is the
intellectual-ideological device that permits U.S. hegemony to obtain
the consent of hegemonized communities by offering and promoting
an alternative to political struggle. Indeed, the international human
rights movement is based on the assumption, itself naturalistic and
universalistic, that individual rights (constructed in the American
sense only) require institutional tools to assert those rights. As
suggested above, U.S. courts of law are ready to respond and to
declare themselves available for this civilizing and normalizing
mission.
The class action is the key to understanding this phenomenon.
Counsel's briefs in Motions to Dismiss and expert witness
declarations in forum non conveniens motions are the technical loci in
American legal discourse where this hegemonic pro-plaintiff attitude
finds expression. This is not, of course, the place to discuss class
actions in any detail. Suffice to say that without class actions
aggregating relatively small claims, Holocaust victims and their heirs,
environmental litigants, victims of pharmaceutical industries, and
myriad other groups of harmed individuals would rarely, alone, have
the ability to attract powerful plaintiffs' attorneys to assert their
claims on their behalf and, consequently, to gain a comparative
advantage from U.S. law as a forum for international law litigation.
In fact, invariably, the winning strategy in defeating forum non
conveniens motions is to show that the interest being litigated as a
class action in the U.S. could never find access to courts anywhere
else in the world because of the lack of the class action as a tool.
Since class actions are usually used in the context of egregious, selfish
acts by defendants affecting the life and limb of thousands of people,
it is clear that the rhetorical element of showing that only American
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legal process could vindicate the rights of so many people is truly a
winning argument. Of course, this demonstrates a denial of the
possible use of the political process abroad and reinforces the image
of U.S. law as a gift to humankind. If one adds that the basis for
jurisdiction in not a small percentage of complex international
litigation derives from jus cogens violations, it becomes clear that the
plaintiff's position is so strong that it would be difficult to defend on
more technical grounds.
Part M
Initiation of an international class action in the United States on
the basis of jus cogens violations is a tremendously complex and
expensive procedure. Class actions are carried on in the name of the
so-called "named plaintiffs." A "putative" class action implies that,
after the preliminary issues are addressed, assuming that defendant's
motion to dismiss is denied, the class must be "certified" in order for
the "putative" class to be recognized. And, once again, class
certification is tremendously expensive.
Interestingly, class
certification not only grants a de facto monopoly to strong and
powerful American-based plaintiffs' firms (the only ones that have
the resources and skills to litigate in the name of a world-wide class of
plaintiffs), but also introduces into the international arena a number
of typically American technical devices. These include showing that
the interests of the class predominate over the interests of individual
plaintiffs and even the culture, unknown elsewhere, of private law
litigation as a public policy instrument rather than as a mere disputeresolution device. The Holocaust litigation is, of course, a prime
example of this tendency to handle through private law that which
has traditionally only been remedied through public law initiatives or
the political process.
Hence, because of the attractive force of the American courts for
international forum shoppers, and because of the traditional
reluctance of U.S. courts (motivated by international human rights
and by notions of jus cogens) to give up jurisdiction in favor of foreign
courts, a quite interesting phenomenon has emerged. Concepts and
notions that are inherently American have become part of the
common vocabulary and culture of the international legal practice,
even among lawyers belonging to Civil Law jurisdictions. Typically,
international defendants that are sued in American courts will refer
the case to their own local firms, which in turn will have to rely on
corresponding American-based firms and to familiarize themselves, at
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least superficially, with American notions and phases of litigation. In
the long run, it is easy to predict that this phenomenon will grant yet
another comparative advantage to large corporate international
mega-firms, the only ones that, wherever located in the world, can
afford to keep on their staff American-trained lawyers able to
understand what is going on in the American setting.43
Hence, with respect to impact on the international legal practice,
one can note at least a couple of related phenomena. On the one
hand, American legal culture has spread throughout the world, with
notions such as that of discovery, or American style due process
penetrating legal cultures world-wide. On the other hand, Americantrained lawyers have become more and more marketable abroad so
that law graduates world-wide have strong incentives to participate in
one of the many LL.M. programs that U.S. law schools aggressively
market. But of course, an LL.M. does not an American lawyer make,
so fully educated American lawyers will become increasingly
necessary throughout the globalized world.
As a consequence, the spread of American law abroad is now
finding another powerful vehicle. Not only is the U.S. academy
offering practically valuable training (as has been the case for quite a
while") but U.S. courts of law are also becoming a powerful vehicle
through their jurisdictional reach.
Before attempting a few conclusions, it is important to dwell
briefly on the issue of choice of law.
As is well known to any lawyer involved in international legal
practice, the choice of substantive law might be a crucial factor in
forum shopping." Every jurisdiction applies its own choice of law
rules and different jurisdictions might point to different rules for the
same transaction. American choice of law rules are considered very
advanced and the Americans are considered world masters in the
field of private international law because, the United States being a
full-fledged federal judicial system with a fully integrated market, the
choice of law issue has always been part of the everyday practice of
law. The American conflict of law system is very complex but also
43. See UGO MATTEI, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AS AN ORGANISATION:
UNDERSTANDING CHANGES IN COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW IN LAWYER'S
PRACrICE AND IDEALS (1997).

44. See Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 229 (1991).
45. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63
TUL. L. REV. 533 (1989).
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very pragmatic. It is based on the fundamental idea that the legal
system that has the more intense contact with the transaction should
prevail. It is, however, also very sensitive to the idea that the
commonalities between legal systems should be exploited in order to
promote a notion of judicial economy sensitive to and aware of the
tremendous costs that applying a foreign law might imply. Hence a
strong functionalist flavor finds its way into the choice of law
discourse, which points at not bothering to belabor the application of
foreign law when the results of its application would not be terribly
different from those that would be reached by application of U.S. law.
In litigation attracted to the American system based on the jus cogens
idea, this functionalist attitude finds a strong positive expression in
Article 38 of the statute of the International Court of Justice, which
promotes the common principles of law recognized by the "civilized
nations" to the ranking of source of law in international matters. 6
When, as in the case of Holocaust-related litigation, applicable
law would be that of a profoundly foreign legal system applied as
interpreted more than half a century ago by courts that in many cases
no longer exist, the temptation to short-circuit foreign law and instead
apply broad common principles is strong indeed. And of course,
these broad principles themselves end up being interpreted in light of
American culture so that even the kind of diversity and cultural
sensitivity that might be provided by private international law is at
risk of being lost.
Part IV
The previous discussion suggests some institutional factors,
formal and informal, that have attracted high profile Holocaustrelated litigation to the United States. In Part II, we discussed some
formal factors, such as the existence of the class action and the
46. Article 38 provides, in relevant part:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations,
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S.
No. 993.
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structure of legal fees. In Part III, we glanced at some informal
factors such as the birth of a global class of American-minded
practitioners carrying with them a mentalitg and rhetoric over the rule
of law and the international legal order. To such informal factors one
should, of course, add the growth of the English language as a worldwide lingua franca, a phenomenon itself offering a tremendously
important competitive advantage to U.S. law.
Any explanatory framework requires clarification that the U.S.
legal hegemony that we have attributed to such institutional factors
may not be based only on those factors alone. There is also an
underlying legal reality giving them force and effect: in order for the
law to become binding, it needs to be sufficiently threatening to
encourage defendants to respect its orders and to make international
actors play according to the rules that it sets. Indeed, in international
litigation, the door to defaulting is always open, and foreign
judgments are not easy to collect.
So, one must ask the question: why should not defendants default
in the U.S., particularly given the tremendous costs imposed on them
even at the earliest stages of litigation? From the legal point of view,
American complex litigation is so far removed from the standards of
due process of most non-American jurisdictions that it is very unlikely
any court of the world would enforce most of the judgments entered
in the United States against non-American defendants for facts
happening abroad. European jurists, for example, are accustomed to
a notion of due process of law that is not limited to the idea that
plaintiffs should have tremendously strong tools in order to vindicate
their rights. They strongly believe that the possibility that a
defendant might be innocent is entitled to the same due process
guarantees as the possibility that the plaintiffs' human rights have
been violated.47 It is well known, but worth repeating, that in
international litigation, when the matter of recognition in forum B of
a judgment entered in forum A arises, there are two possible
outcomes. If there is some sort of "Full Faith and Credit" clause,
such as that provided among American states by the Constitution or
among European Union states by the Bruxelles Convention, the
convention applies and states recognize each other's judgments
without difficulty. If there is no international agreement, however,
forum B will recognize the judgment entered in forum A only if under
the rules of jurisdiction of forum B, forum A would have had
47. See supra note 20.
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jurisdiction. Moreover, the recognition would occur only if standards
of due process as interpreted in forum B have been respected in
forum A.48
Clearly, in the case of litigation attracted to the United States
only on the basis of violations of jus cogens, with no connection to
U.S. soil, the jurisdictional issue alone would defeat recognition in
most courts outside of the United States. But even if jurisdiction
were to be recognized, the issues of discovery and the kinds of
remedies available-in particular punitive damages-would be
invariably perceived as against the ordre public and not enforced in
other jurisdictions.
If this is the case, then it is of great interest to observe that the
U.S. legal system, considered so different in fundamental conceptions
of fair procedure from most of the other systems in the world,
nevertheless imposes its standards world-wide, without any possibility
of global enforcement. And here the explanation can only be
economic. Should the courts of an economically weaker country
behave like U.S. courts, there is no question that most defendants
would default, denying de facto the power of local courts to assert
jurisdiction over them. Since, however, most international corporate
defendants do have significant assets in the United States and wish to
avail themselves of business opportunities here, the jurisdiction of
U.S. courts is in some sense voluntarily accepted and acknowledged
because defendants are fearful for their current or future economic
assets and hopeful that future business opportunity is worth the risk
of acquiescing to jurisdiction.
Such an economic explanation offers new strength to Gramscian
theories of hegemony4 9 and shows that the comparative lawyer's
dismissal of the connection between the economic infrastructure and
the legal system has been too hasty."

ET AL., supra note 19, at 414.
49. See Robert W. Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond
International Relations Theory, 10 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD., 126-55 (1981);
Antonio Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method, 12
MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD., 162-75 (1983); Stephen R. Gill & David Law, Global
Hegemony and the StructuralPowerof Capital,33 INT'L STUD. Q. 475 (1989).
50. The classic discussion of independence is provided in ALAN WATSON, LEGAL
For a recent
TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974).
reapprisal, see ELISABETTA GRANDE, IMITAZIONE E DIRrITO. IPOTESI SULLA
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48. See SCHLESINGER

